Introduction
Following the adoption of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (Civil Union Act) on 1
December 2006, South Africa became one of very few countries to confer legal protection and marriage benefits on partners in same-sex relationships. The legislation was adopted as a direct response to the landmark decision of the Constitutional Court in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie. 1 The Court had declared the lack of the legal recognition of same-sex relationships unconstitutional and had given Parliament a period of one year in which to develop a remedy that would allow same-sex partners to formalise their relationships. The Court had also cautioned Parliament to be sensitive and not to provide a remedy that would be calculated and perceived as producing new forms of marginalisation.
2
In this regard, Parliament opted to develop a separate institution of marriage, apart from the existing forms of marriage such as civil or customary marriages.
3
This new institution of marriage has generated extensive and complex questions in relation to the quality of legal protection accorded to partners in same-sex relationships. These questions touch on very broad issues such as institutional, social and religious beliefs, views and opinions, civil rights, ethics, values and principles. 4 They undermine the development of a single strategy that will draw an appropriate balance between certain competing rights such as the rights to freedom of sexual orientation and freedom of religion. Such a balance may, however, be necessary to ensure that the substantive translation of the right to equality is an actuality for couples in same-sex relationships.
The purpose of this contribution is to provide a succinct overview and analysis of the features of the Act. The objective is to determine the significance of the Act for the substantive translation of the right to freedom of sexual orientation vis-à-vis the right to freedom of religion within the framework of the right to equality.
It is argued, firstly, that the Act has the potential to produce new forms of marginalisation, despite the caution by the Court. Secondly, the categorisation of marriages into heterosexual and homosexual marriages or civil unions has created legal uncertainty about the essence of the notion of equal rights for all, without distinction, as envisaged in the Constitution. Lastly, the allocation of people into various categories rather than allowing them to be just 'human beings' could defeat the purpose of establishing a 'just' society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.
The intention is not to argue for a 'one-size-fits-all' approach, but to identify some of the factors which may be a barrier to the implementation of the Act and which could undermine the equal worth of persons in same-sex relationships.
This contribution is therefore limited to an examination of the quality of the protection accorded to same-sex couples, and does not include an analysis of the nature of the institution of marriage itself or the theological and social dimensions of same-sex marriages.
5 4 See Robinson and Swanepoel 2004 PER 87-135 . They had already identified the challenges relating to same-sex relationships even before the adoption of the Act. 5
Sachs J in Fourie acknowledged the role played by religion in public life and strongly held that it would be out of order (the author's emphasis) to employ the religious sentiments of some as a guide to trample on the constitutional rights of others, par 92.
The general features of the Act
The Constitutional Court has emphasised that the legislature is better placed to fundamental human rights became a major casualty of the conflict between the minority which reserved for itself all control over the political instruments of the state and the majority who sought to resist the domination and where their resistance was met by the laws that were designed to counter the effectiveness of such resistance.
8
The requirement for the development of legal measures in the quest for the elimination of inequalities and discrimination is also endorsed in the preamble of the Promotion of Equality and the Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 9 which provides that:
the prohibition of unfair discrimination and the promotion of the achievement of equality requires the development of special legal and other measures, of historically disadvantaged individuals, communities and social groups who were dispossessed of their land and resources, deprived of their human dignity and who continue to endure such consequences.
The adoption of the measures referred to here the engagement of a proactive and activist legislature in order to achieve the objectives envisaged in the there is a duty imposed on the state and all of its organs not to perform any act that infringes these rights. In some circumstances there would also be a positive component which obliges the state and its organs to provide appropriate protection to everyone through laws and structures designed to afford such protection.
11
The adoption of the Civil Union Act therefore took place within the context and against the background of affirming the legitimacy of the development of measures that are designed to protect persons or categories of persons previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 12 It takes into account South Africa's history, and the prejudicial context that people in same-sex relationships find themselves in -even in the new constitutional dispensation.
13
Effectively, it gives due recognition to the fact that the elimination of systematic discrimination against people in same-sex relationships cannot be achieved without positive action being taken by the state.
14 This Act was adopted in the context of a specific rights perspective, in order to protect the rights of people in same-sex relationships, 15 who are often and are most vulnerable to discrimination and persecution. The normative impetus and the specific focus behind the adoption of the Act is to be found in section 9 of the Constitution. 16 This provision provides a sound framework for the couples, are accorded equal dignity and respect, regardless of their membership of particular groups.
22
The intersection of the right to equality and the right to human dignity 23 as envisaged in the preamble of the Act is of the utmost importance. The centrality of these rights, both in the Constitution and the Act bears witness to the lessons drawn from the past, that make these rights the cornerstone and foundational values in reconstructing the future of couples in same-sex relationships. The interdependence of these rights was similarly expressed by Sachs J in National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 24 as follows:
the equality principle and the dignity principle should not be seen as competitive but rather as complementary. Inequality is established not simply through group-based differential treatment, but through differentiation which perpetuates disadvantage and leads to the scarring of the sense of dignity and self-worth associated with membership of the group. Conversely, an invasion of dignity is more easily established when there is an inequality of power and status between the violator and the victim.
25
In essence, the interdependence of these rights (the right to equality and the right to human dignity) provides a firm basis for a deeper understanding of the function of the law, including the Civil Union Act itself, in promoting the equal worth of all human beings. It enables the development of insight into the determination of the significance of the law in addressing both the underlying social and legal networks that limit the potential of the law to generate social change. It forms the basis upon which to establish a set of demands based on the intrinsic worth of the individual. It asserts that the right to marry without regard to the sex of the parties is a fundamental right of all persons and that limiting the applicability of such a right to heterosexuals only is irrational and invidiously discriminatory. 26 The extension of the right of equal opportunity to marriage for same-sex couples requires a positive action that directly benefits Overall, the Civil Union Act serves as a direct and accessible legal instrument in laying the foundation for the equal rights of people in same-sex relationships.
It seeks to limit any potential for reliance on the courts for enforcing the right to equality because, as Mokgoro says, 'litigation tends to be the privilege of the economically empowered'. In addition, section 3 of the Act endorses the legal separateness of same-sex couples in that it gives same-sex relationships an inferior status by providing that: 'this Act applies to civil partners joined in a civil union' only. The Civil Union Act ignored and actually missed an opportunity for addressing some of the complex questions that may be raised, especially within the system of customary law in, relation to the marriage of couples in same-sex relationships. These questions are related to procedural requirements such as the payment of ilobola.
As the customary-law system is uncodified and evolves with changing circumstances, the fact that the Act does not recognise equal access to marriage either in terms of customary or common law puts couples in same-sex relationships at a disadvantage. It increases the vulnerability of couples in same-sex relationships, especially when they are beyond the borders of South Africa, and exposes them to persecution, as evidenced by the recent tabling of the Ugandan Bill prohibiting same-sex relationships. 48 The Act may also undermine South Africa's obligations under international law as envisaged in the preamble of the Equality Act, which provides that:
South Africa also has international obligations under binding treaties and customary international law in the field of human rights which promote equality and prohibit unfair discrimination.
In essence, this section has closed off an opportunity for parallel development of the existing marital regimes within the context of partners in same-sex have provided an opportunity for tolerance and accommodation of couples in same-sex relationships within the framework especially of the African value system.
Section 6 of the Act, which is intertwined with section 5, further provides that: a marriage officer, other than the one designated in terms of section 5, may in writing inform the Minister that he or she objects on the grounds of conscience, religion and belief to solemnise a civil union between persons of the same sex, whereupon that marriage officer shall not be compelled to solemnise such civil union.
The equal contest between the right to freedom of sexual orientation and the right to freedom of religion has made the development of the principles of nondiscrimination subject to the social, moral and legal convictions of those than whether or not the Civil Union Act, through its effective application and proper interpretation, will be able to eliminate the unequal consequences of such differentiation. For example, by having adopted the Civil Union Act, the government has acknowledged that same-sex couples are identically situated to heterosexual couples in relation to the marital laws of South Africa.
As argued elsewhere, the 'differentiation approach' not only prohibits differential treatment, but also allows for differentiation in appropriate cases to enhance the respect and the promotion of fundamental freedoms for everyone. 52 The identical treatment of similarly situated individuals (same-sex and heterosexual couples) without an adequate justification of the legitimate purpose of the government runs contrary to the principles of non-discrimination.
53
In this regard, the failure of the Act to recognise the difference between and identity of same-sex and heterosexual couples undermines the argument by Sachs J in Fourie, where he argues that: a democratic, universalistic, caring and aspirationally egalitarian society embraces everyone and accepts people for who they are. To penalise people for being who and what they are is profoundly disrespectful of the human personality and violatory of equality. Equality means equal concern and respect across difference. It does not presuppose the elimination or suppression of difference. Respect for human rights requires the affirmation of self, not the denial of self. Equality therefore does not imply a levelling or homogenisation of behaviour or extolling one form as supreme, and another as inferior, but an acknowledgement and acceptance of difference. At the very least, it affirms that difference should not be the basis for exclusion, marginalisation and stigma. At best, it celebrates the vitality that difference brings to any society.
54
The identical treatment of different types of couples within the framework of the right to freedom of religion fails to acknowledge the significance of the law in dealing with both the legal and socially constructed roles that seek to compromise the equal worth of the rights of same-sex couples. Constitutional Court on equality, that focusing on the impact of the differentiation on vulnerable groups, including same-sex couples. 55 The jurisprudence has put an emphasis on the substantive realisation of the right to equality. The purpose of such an emphasis is to establish a future that is founded on the ideals of reconciliation in and reconstruction of our society.
56
The right to equal benefit of the law cannot be a 'throat-clearing' exercise, as argued by Sachs J in Mhlungu, 57 if it has to equally address the intense suffering of the past and the injustice which continues to manifest itself in this new constitutional dispensation.
The contest between the right to freedom of religion and the right to freedom of sexual orientation in the Civil Union Act has made the substantive translation of the right to equality subject to a 'mere choice'. The choice enables the marriage officers to use their discretion, forcing them to draw a distinction between people, which perpetuates the privileges of couples in heterosexual relationships, as argued by Langa CJ in MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 58 that:
[the discretion] enforces mainstream and historically privileged forms ... at the expense of minority and historically excluded [groups] . It thus places a burden on [partners in same-sex relationships] who are unable to express themselves fully ... in an environment that does not completely accept them.
59
The foundation for the relegation of substantive principles such as the right to equality to such a discretion or a "mere choice" was laid down by the Court in Fourie, where it was held that:
religious institutions would remain undisturbed in their ability to perform marriage ceremonies according to their own tenets, and thus if they wished, to celebrate heterosexual marriages only. Marriage officers subscribing to certain religious beliefs may marginalise samesex couples seeking marriage because they do not or cannot conform to 'perceived certain acceptable' social norms. sex marriages may have as far as the concept 'marriage' is concerned, because the Act does not deconstruct the old standing principle that marriage is between a 'man and a woman to the exclusion of others'.
64
The denial of the equal status of marriage for same-sex couples compromises the potential of using the law as a strategy for social change. As Kakabadse puts it:
law is an ideology of justice that encompasses equal accessibility which must lead to the results that are individually and socially just.
65
In this regard, the legal separateness of equal rights for same-sex vis-à-vis heterosexual couples has created a 'social, legal and constitutional dilemma'
regarding the central role of the law and its impact on the manner in which members of society should relate to one another. The interdependence of law and social justice provides an opportunity for examining the existence of underlying social ills that could be harmful to our society.
Of great concern is the fact that the interaction between the law and society forms the basis for understanding not only the law itself, but also broader issues relating to equality and social justice. Therefore, the disparity of equal access to marriage endorses an argument by Faundez that legal reform is a 'fatal attraction', as he contends that: the adoption of these laws is not always the best of the alternatives available to permeate every facet of the laws because social problems are not always resolved by enacting new rules. It is often the case that new legal rules are not the best solution either because there is no agreement in society as to the content of the rules or because the rules simply do not reach the group that they are meant to reach. 
Conclusion
Having provided more questions than answers, the Fourie judgment just captured the scenario by laying the foundation for the adoption of the Civil 
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